A Discussion on Free Will, Subjectivity and the Physics of the Nervous System

A discussion on the existence of free will goes back at least to the Middle Ages. The problem is
related to reductionism, i.e. the claim that subjectivity could be considered an epiphenomenon of the
cerebral processes, the argument being that all our sensorial perceptions, the control of movement,
our states of wakefulness or of unconsciousness can be related to the activation or to the block of
specific areas of our cerebral cortex. In the frame of this conception free will is denied essentially on
the basis of physical determinism. In contrast to such attitude, we argue that experiences like
consciousness of ourselves, of a personal identity or even simply of qualia completely escape from
concepts of physical nature. The point of view of Physics and introspection appear both essential but
complementary and irreducible one to the other; any attempt to do so brings to unresolvable aporias.
Specifically on free will, we note that our nervous system is a complex mesoscopic system, for an
understanding of its occurrences, reference to Quantum Theory is essential. Physics does not provide
any cause for one response rather than another, while we experience our response to be intentional.
Quantum Mechanics seems to offer the logical space to reconcile Physics with introspection. Some
basic notions on the structure and working of neurons and of the central nervous systems are also
recalled, Liebet’s experiments on retarded awareness and the role of free will in the knowledge
process are discussed.